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Abstract
Anomaly detection refers to finding observations which do not conform to expected
behavior. It is widely applied in many domains such as image processing, fraud detec-
tion, intrusion detection, medical health, etc. However, most of the anomaly detection
techniques focus on detecting a single anomalous instance. Such techniques fail when
there is only a slight difference between the anomalous instance and a non-anomalous
instance. Various collective anomaly detection techniques (based on clustering, deep
learning, etc) have been developed that determine whether a group of records form an
anomaly even though they are only slightly anomalous instances. However, they do not
provide any information about the attributes that make the group anomalous. In other
words, they are focussed only on detecting records that are collectively anomalous and
are not able to detect anomalous patterns in general. FGSS [45] is a scalable anomalous
pattern detection technique that searches over both records and attributes. However,
FGSS has several limitations preventing it from functioning on continuous, unstructured
and high dimensional data such as images, etc. We propose a general framework called
DeepFGSS, which uses Autoencoder, enabling it to operate on any kind of data. We
evaluate its performance using four experiments on both structured and unstructured
data to determine its accuracy of detecting anomalies and efficiency of distinguishing
between datasets containing anomalies and ones that do not.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Any data instance is considered to be an anomaly if its characteristics deviate from
what is considered normal, expected or standard. Such deviations can be outliers, or an
exception, or a novel instance, or some contaminant or simply noise. Hence, the purpose
of detecting anomalies can be outlier detection, noise removal, or sometimes detecting
interesting patterns. Generally, anomaly detection refers to the problem of finding any
pattern in data that does not conform to expected behavior. Anomaly detection is
significantly used in applications such as banking systems, health care, cyber-security,
military surveillance for enemy activities and other safety-critical systems.
Usually, anomalies are recognized as harmful deviations. For example, as mentioned
previously, detecting fraudulent transaction in bank statements, detecting a tumor in
MRI, detecting unusual network traffic and so on. However, anomalies do not necessarily
have to be bad either. For example, for an advertisement company getting Rate Of
Interest exceedingly high for this month compared to the gain from previous months is
a good sign.
Irrespective of whether an anomaly is harmful or not, techniques used for detecting
such aberrations are the same. Over time, there have been various techniques developed
which work on different principles and assumptions. Most of the techniques developed
so far focuss on detecting point anomalies. In the next section, we will explain what are
point anomalies along with techniques to detect them followed by limitations of such
techniques.
1
21.1 Point Anomaly Detection
Point anomaly is an anomaly when a single data instance is anomalous. Chandola,
Banerjee, and Kumar [11] provided an exhaustive categorization of anomaly detection
techniques and their assumptions and principles.
Classification based anomaly detection techniques are supervised. First, a model is
trained on the training dataset to classify a data instance. Then, the model classifies
the data instance into anomalous or normal class. Examples of such machine learning
techniques are logistic regression, SVM, etc.
Nearest neighbor based anomaly detection techniques, first, calculate the neighbor-
hood of the data instance based on some distance metric (for eg, Euclidean distance for
continuous attributes, matching the coefficient for categorical attributes, etc) and then,
label data instances falling in the dense neighborhood as normal and those far from
their nearest neighbor as anomalies. Examples of such techniques can be K-Nearest
Neighbor (KNN), or intelligent data structures such as k-d trees, etc.
Anomaly detection techniques based on clustering work on different principles:-
Density-Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with Noise (DBSCAN)[28], Shared
Nearest Neighbor (SNN) [27], WaveClustering [58]- classifies those data instances as
anomalies which do not belong to any cluster; Self Organizing Map (SOM) [65], K-
means clustering, Expectation Maximization labels those data instances as anomalies
that are far from the centroid of their nearest cluster; Cluster-Based Local Outlier Fac-
tor(CBLOF) [35], CDtrees [61] labels those data instances as anomalous which belong
to a cluster which is either small or sparse.
Statistical anomaly detection techniques learn a model which can generate the data
seen in the training dataset and then statistical inference test is applied to determine
if a given test instance is an anomaly or not based on whether it occurs in a high
probabilistic regions or low. These can be parametric such as Gaussian-based model like
Z-score or extreme value analysis [59], or non-parametric techniques (such as histogram
based outlier score[32], Generative Adversarial Networks [33], etc).
31.2 Limitations
These anomaly detection methods focus on the identification of a single anomalous data
record. For example, detecting a fraudulent transaction in financial data, detecting
a system malfunction while analyzing system log files, detecting bots that generate
fake reviews on social media platform, detecting energy leakage in smart houses or
detecting excessive power utilization in data centers, etc. Some of the anomaly detection
techniques devised are also domain specific, making them hard to adapt to a different
problem.
However, in the real world, sometimes it’s hard to detect anomalous behavior where
each individual data instance can be slightly anomalous making it difficult for anomaly
detection techniques to be effective, mentioned in the previous section, to detect. For
example, in the case of detecting fraudulent transactions in financial data, an intelligent
fraudster will attempt to disguise their activity so that it closely resembles legitimate
transactions making each fraudulent transaction only slightly anomalous. This makes
the situation worse to discern the malign activity. Similarly, an intelligent hacker might
also try to mimic normal network activity while sniffing data. In the case of customs
officials responsible for detecting smuggled items, they must decide which shipments to
inspect. An intelligent smuggler would intelligently sneak in contrabands by making
similar illegal shipments - let’s say, with same declared contents on the contraband,
shipping through the same company name, to the same port.
In such cases, classification techniques will not be able to learn a clear decision
boundary between normal and anomalous instances. Nearest neighbor based techniques
also fail to detect such anomalies as the records are only slightly anomalous and hence
might fall into a denser region with other normal instances. Clustering based techniques
might also fail as anomalous instances which almost resemble normal instances might
not be farther from the centroid of the cluster or anomalous instances might themselves
be part of a larger cluster. Traditional statistical techniques will also not be able to
distinguish slightly anomalous instances because they might not necessarily fall in a
region with low probability density.
One way to detect such anomalous behaviors is by searching for groups of these
similar data instances each of which is only slightly anomalous. Such anomalies are
4called collective anomalies whereas all the previous anomaly detection techniques aim
for detecting point anomalies (where a single data point in a dataset is sufficiently
anomalous)
Chapter 2
Collective Anomaly Detection
Collective anomaly is defined as a collection of related data instances that are anoma-
lous compared to the entire data set but individual data instances may not be anomalies
themselves. For example, in a UDP flooding attack in the network domain, the attacker
sends multiple concurrent UDP packets which causes the host application to throttle
and reply with an ICMP destination unreachable packet. This event overloads the
host machine and renders it inaccessible. A single UDP packet sent on a port is not
an anomalous event. However, when their frequency exceeds a certain level, it be-
comes collectively anomalous. Figure 2.2 illustrates a famous example [11] of a human
electrocardiogram output with a small region being highlighted in red which denotes
a collective anomaly. Note that the low value of ECG itself is not an indication of
abnormal behavior.
2.1 Background
The survey by Chandola, Banerjee, and Kumar [11] provides an exhaustive survey of
various collective anomaly detection techniques developed until 2009. Collective anoma-
lies majorly have two kinds of relations: sequential and spatial. Some techniques [9]
convert the sequences into a finite set of features and run a point anomaly detection
algorithm. One challenge in such methods is that the sequences can be of variable
length. One of the techniques to overcome that challenge is box-modeling [10] which
maps each term in the sequence to one of the boxes based on its value and use those
5
6Figure 2.1: Collective anomaly corresponding to an Atrial Premature Contraction in an
human ECG output
boxes as a set of features to use any of the point anomaly detection techniques. Re-
cently, deep learning based techniques have also been developed to detect anomalous
sequences with variable length. One such technique utilizes Long Short Term Memory
RNNs [7] which predicts several time steps ahead of the input. If the prediction error
is greater than some threshold for a given number of time steps, it indicates that the
most recent sequence is a collective anomaly. Several clustering based techniques [8]
have also been developed with similarity metric such as longest common subsequence,
etc. to detect collective anomalies as a cluster. NKICAD algorithm [3] is another clus-
tering based algorithm which first runs x-means algorithm [49] and then the features of
the data are aggregated to form a new set of features and each cluster is re-clustered.
The cluster with the minimum variance is returned as a collective anomaly. Informa-
tion theoretic based co-clustering technique [2] has also been developed which return
the largest row cluster as the candidate collective anomalies. Hurst Parameter based
Collective Anomaly Detection (HCADET) [1] is a method which first runs x-means
clustering on the entire dataset and then sorts the clusters based on their H [14] value
and returns top-η clusters as a set of collective anomaly candidates.
Most of these techniques work in an unsupervised fashion with no need for labeled
7Figure 2.2: Collective anomaly corresponding to an Atrial Premature Contraction in an
human ECG output
data. However, these techniques do not provide any insights about the attributes which
are anomalous with respect to normal data.
In the next section, we will explain three techniques which can detect both anomalous
records and attributes (called as anomalous patterns) along with their limitations.
2.2 Detection of Anomalous Patterns
2.2.1 Problem Statement
Anomalous Pattern Detection is slightly different from anomaly detection. Instead of
identifying individual anomalies, the aim is to identify a set of records and attributes
that together form an anomalous pattern. The underlying assumption of anomalous
pattern detection is that the majority of data generated belongs to the same distri-
bution representing normal behavior of the system and the groups of records that are
unexpected given the typical data distribution are called anomalous patterns.
McFowland et al. [45] defines the anomalous pattern detection problem as ”detect-
ing groups of anomalous records and also categorizing their features with the intention
of understanding the anomalous process that generated these groups”. The premise on
8which anomalous pattern detection techniques work is that most records in the data are
normal which follow an expected behavior and are generated by a single background
process. A very small amount of data contains anomalous records that possess char-
acteristics different from the expected behavior as they are generated by an alternate
process. Most techniques are able to detect such anomalous records due to their signifi-
cant difference in behavior. However, these techniques fail when the anomalous process
is only slightly different than the background (normal) process. Anomalous pattern
detection techniques rely on the assumption that records generated by the anomalous
process are also self-similar just like normal records are expected to have similar char-
acteristics among themselves. For example, in the case of network intrusion, the same
task might be repeated a number of times to gain unauthorized access to a system.
In health monitoring, a disease outbreak can lead to a large number of disease cases
with almost identical features being reported. Anomalous pattern detection techniques
rely on this assumption and try to look for collective anomalies by analyzing groups of
records together.
We explain three major anomalous pattern detection techniques in this section. All
three techniques extend the idea of Bayesian Network Anomaly Detector [20] where
they first learn the distribution under null hypothesis H0 using a Bayesian Network and
then compute the likelihood of all records under H0. Then, records with low likelihood
values are reported as anomalies. As explained before, this is one of the point anomaly
detection techniques and fails to detect records if they are only slightly anomalous
under H0. This limitation exists because a Bayesian Network can only learn the joint
probability distribution of the entire data and none of the characteristics embedded
in the group structure of the records. The three techniques that we will explain in
this section utilize the Bayesian Network to detect groups of records and a subset of
attributes that makes the group a collective anomaly.
2.2.2 Anomaly Pattern Detection (APD)
Anomaly Pattern Detection (APD)[21] technique utilizes Bayesian Network to detect
anomalous subsets instead of anomalous records. It works in four steps. Step 1, by
learning the distribution through Bayesian Network, it computes the likelihood of each
record. Step 2, given a fixed anomaly score threshold,it makes all records exceeding it
9as candidate anomalies. Step 3, it evaluates a set of candidate rules, each consisting of a
conjunction of attribute values. For example, in KDD Cup Network Intrusion dataset,
one possible rule could be ”protocol type=tcp AND service=http”. For each possible
rule Q, it computes the number of records matching the rule Q. Formally, for any rule
Q constituting of attributes {Am = v AND An = u}, records Ri and Rj can be in the
group if and only if Aim = Bjm = v and Ain = Bjn = u. Step 4, it then checks if the
observed number of anomalies in the test set is significantly larger than the expected
number of anomalies using Fisher’s Exact Test. If the observed count is large then APD
signals that some records in that subset might be anomalous and it also provides the
set of attributes from the rule that was selected.
However, APD has several limitations. First, it considers grouping those records
with matching attribute values per the selected rule. Such a strict constraint lowers the
probability of detecting a subset of anomalous records with non-matching attributes
according to the selected rule. Second, APD scores each record based on its individual
anomalous behavior which limits its capability to detect records when they are collec-
tively compared to normal records. Third, it can not detect patterns that are affected
over more than 2 attributes as it considers rules comprising of only two attributes. Con-
sidering all possible combinations of attributes is computationally impractical. Hence, it
might not be suited for high dimensional data. Four, it does not leverage self-similarity
of anomalous records and hence records in the subset might not be generated by the
same anomalous process. Hence, it is difficult to tell if the subset that is detected is
truly an anomalous pattern or simply noise. Last, attributes detected by APD are the
ones corresponding to the selected rule and hence might not correspond to the truly
anomalous subset of attributes. Hence, APD doesn’t provide any information about
attributes that are affected by the anomalous process.
2.2.3 Anomalous Group Detection (AGD)
Anomalous Group Detection is another technique that detects a group of records in a
categorical dataset such that they have similar characteristics. AGD overcomes some
limitations of APD. Unlike APD, AGD makes sure that records detected are not noise
or generated by a different anomalous process. Secondly, it also allows records to be
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detected even when their attribute values do not match. Also, it enhances it’s detec-
tion power by utilizing self-similarity among the attributes generated by the anomalous
process.
First, AGD learns the probability distribution of the data under H0 using Bayesian
Network. Second, it identifies all the candidate subsets, based on a greedy search
heuristic. It forms each subset iteratively based on a search heuristic which works as
follows:
For each Ri ∈ Datatest, initialize S ← Ri, and then, add any Rj ∈ Datatest − DataS
such that F (S ∪Rj) > F (S) where F (S) is likelihood ratio statistic defined as follows:
F (S) =
P (DataS |H1(S))
P (DataS |H0) =
∏
i∈S P (Ri|H1(S))∏
i∈S P (Ri|H0)
(2.1)
where H1(S) represents an alternative hypothesis learned from the records in S. Third,
for each subset S, compute the score as the likelihood ratio statistic of that subset,
F (S). Finally, the subset with the highest score is obtained as the most anomalous
group. This scoring metric gives a higher score to anomalous records, as well as setting
a constraint of similarity between records in a group. If the records in S are similar
to each other, then the alternate hypothesis, H1(S) will be able to model them tightly.
This will result in a high value of the likelihood P (DataS |H1(S)), thus increasing the
score F (S). Also, records that do not belong to the distribution under H0 will have a
low value of the likelihood P (DataS |H0), again increasing the group score F (S).
Still, AGD addresses only some of APD’s limitations. AGD has several limitations
too. To generate all possible subsets of records in a computationally feasible manner,
it relies on the greedy search heuristic to reduce the search space. Because of this, the
algorithm may fail to identify the most anomalous subset of the data. Furthermore,
AGD does not provide any insights into the attributes that make the group of records
anomalous.
2.2.4 FGSS using Bayesian Network
Fast Generalized Subset Scan (FGSS) [45] is the method which detects anomalous pat-
tern by searching over subsets of records and attributes both. FGSS overcomes the
limitations of both APD and AGD. It detects self-similar anomalous records and also
provides information about the set of attributes that make the group anomalous. Unlike
11
APD which depends on the pre-defined rules or AGD which follows a greedy approach
which limits their capability to find the most optimal pattern globally, FGSS guaran-
tees the detection of the subset which is the most anomalous in the entire dataset. It
assumes that all attributes are categorical variables.
Formally, let a set of records be denoted as R1...RN and set of attributes as A1...AM
and for each record Ri, vij is the value of each attribute Aj . Any subset S is defined as
S=R×A, where R ⊆ {R1...RN} and A ⊆ {A1...AM}. FGSS finds the most anomalous
subset as
S∗ = R∗ ×A∗ = argmaxS F (S) (2.2)
where R∗ and A∗ denotes the most anomalous set of records and attributes respectively
and the score function F (S) defines the anomalousness of the subset.
First, a Bayesian Network learns the distribution of data under H0 that no anomalies
are present. Second, for each value vij of the attribute Aj of record Ri, FGSS computes
its likelihood lij given H0. lij represents the conditional probability of the observed
value vij given all its parent attribute values for record Ri under the null hypothesis
H0. Third, for each lij it computes an empirical p-value range pij (we explain this in
more detail in further section) which serves as a measure of how uncommon it is to see
a likelihood as low as lij under H0. Fourth, it then begins searching for the subset S
∗
such that F (S∗) is maximum in the following way; it first selects a random subset of
attributes A′ and it then looks for the subset of records R′ that maximizes F (R′ ×A′);
then it fixes the set of records as R′ and then it finds next set of attributes A′′ which
maximizes F (R′×A′′). It keeps repeating this alternating process until it finds R∗ and
A∗ and returns S∗=R∗ ×A∗ as the most anomalous subset.
FGSS is currently the state of the art technique in terms of scalability, flexibility,
and accuracy. FGSS uses the Higher Criticism (HC) statistic [25] and the Berk-Jones
(BJ) statistic [6] as F (S). Also, McFowland et al. [45] proved that these statistics
follow LTSS property [48] which enables FGSS to scan both records and attributes by
evaluating a linear number of subsets, making it scalable to datasets containing large
number of records. We plan to explain FGSS in more detail in further sections.
Despite being such a powerful technique, FGSS framework has few limitations be-
cause it uses Bayesian Network to model the distribution of the data under the null.
We first explain the theory of Bayesian Network and then understand how it limits the
12
capability of FGSS to detect collective anomalies.
Chapter 3
Motivation
3.1 Preliminary Theory
To understand the problems in the state of the art technique in collective anomaly
detection i.e. FGSS, we need to understand what Bayesian Networks are and how
they work. Then, we will go through its limitations and understand how it limits
the effectiveness of FGSS framework. Then, we will explain how to overcome those
limitations using deep neural networks. One such network is Autoencoder which we
will embed in FGSS framework that is explained in more detail in the next section.
3.1.1 Bayesian Network
Probabilistic Graphical Model (PGM)[41] is a probabilistic model in the form of a graph
structure to represent the conditional dependence between random variables. Each node
in the graph represents a random variable, where the edges between the nodes represent
probabilistic dependencies among the corresponding random variables.
Probabilistic graphical models with the directed acyclic graph (DAG) as its model
structure are called as Bayesian Network [5]. A DAG is determined by vertices (or
nodes) V and a set of directed edges E between those vertices. Each Ai ∈ V represents
a random variable (or an attribute) and an edge eij ∈ E directed from a random
variable Ai to Aj indicates a causal relation where the value of Aj is dependent of the
value of Ai. We call Ai as the parent of Aj and Aj as the child of Ai. A Bayesian
Network must satisfy two conditions. First, there should be no cyclic dependency in
13
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the DAG structure, or in other words, no node should be the ancestor of itself. Second,
each node is conditionally independent of other nodes given its markov blanket, or in
other words, a node is only dependent on its parents, its children and other parents
of its children. These two conditions enable the Bayesian Network to learn the joint
distribution of variables in a computationally efficient way. This is achieved because of
a significant reduction in the number of parameters (initially 2M ) required to represent
the joint probability distribution. Apart from deciding the structure of the Bayesian
Network, one needs need to compute the conditional probability distribution (CPD)
at each node that depends only on its parents. In case of discrete random variables,
CPD for each node can be written in the form of a table with each row representing
a particular combination of its parent values based on which its value is determined.
These individual CPD tables can be used to compute the joint probability distribution
of the occurrence of more than one variable together.
Formal Definition
Formally, Bayesian Network [29] can be defined as follows: A Bayesian Network is
defined by the pair < G,Θ >, where G =< V,E > represents a directed acyclic graph
consisting of a set of vertices V and edges E. Each node Ai ∈ V represents a random
variable annotated by its conditional probability table, and each edge eij ∈ E represents
a causal connection from node Ai to node Aj . Bayesian Network represents the joint
probability distribution over the set of all random variables V determined by a set of
parameters Θ. Let P (Ai) denote the set of all parents of Ai. The conditional probability
table of Ai is determined by θAi ∈ Θ as follows:
For each value ai ∈ Ai and a particular instantiation of parents of Ai as pii ∈ P (Xi),
θAi contains a parameters θai|pii defined as
θai|pii = p(ai|pii) (3.1)
Once we compute θai|pii ∀ai ∈ Ai for i ∈ (1, N), a Bayesian Network specifies the joint
probability distribution ∀Ai ∈ V as follows:
p(A1, A2, ..., AN ) =
N∏
i=1
p(Ai|P (Ai)) (3.2)
15
Figure 3.1 illustrates a simple example of Bayesian Network which depicts the proba-
bility of the software run to complete, denoted by C. This is only dependent on whether
the software is run at a high speed or low speed, denoted by S. The speed of the soft-
ware is further dependent on whether there is a hardware issue, represented by H, or if
the WiFi speed is slow, represented by W . Also, there is high chance that if the wifi is
slow, another website which is rendering some content also might be affected, denoted
by Web.
The joint probability distribution of all variables can be calculated as follows:
P (H,W,S,Web, C) = P (H).P (W |H).P (S|H,W ).P (Web|H,W,S,C)
.P (C|H,W,S,Web)
(3.3)
The total number of parameters required to compute this is 25 − 1 = 31. However,
based on this structure, we can observe some of the properties of Bayesian Network. H
and W do not depend on any other variables. However, when S is given, they both fall
in each other’s markov blanket and are conditionally dependent. Also, given a value
for W , S and W are conditionally independent as they are outside markov blanket of
each other. Similarly, C is independent of all other variables given S. Because of such
properties, Bayesian Network provides a compact factorization of the equation 3.3 as
follows:
P (H,W,S,Web, C) = P (H).P (W ).P (S|H,W ).P (Web|W ).P (C|S) (3.4)
Now, we can observe from the equation 3.4 that we need 1 parameter each for P (H) and
P (W ), 2 parameters each for P (Web|W ) and P (C|S) and 4 parameters for P (S|H,W ).
Hence, the BN form reduces the number of the model parameters, which belong to a
multinomial distribution in this case, from 31 to 10 (1+1+2+2+4) parameters. This
reduction not only makes the learning computationally faster but it also makes the
inference efficient by being robust to bias-variance trade-off.
Compared to learning the parameters of Bayesian Network, structure learning is
a lot more difficult task. Learning a good topology of the Bayesian Network might
require some prior information such as known causal relationships between attributes
or other expert knowledge. With no prior knowledge, learning the best DAG structure is
considered to be an NP-Complete [12] problem because the number of DAG structures
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of software run completion using Bayesian Network
possible is exponential in terms of the number of random variables. Table 3.1 mentions
the four scenarios for bayesian learning. Except for the first case, all other cases are
computationally intractable [5]. For the second case, one can use EM to find a locally
optimal maximum-likelihood estimate of the parameters. Third and fourth case requires
searching through a model space in a greedy fashion which we will not be focusing on.
Case BN structure Observability Proposed learning method
1 Known Full Maximum-likelihood estimation
2 Known Partial EM (or gradient ascent), MCMC
3 Unknown Full Search through model space
4 Unknown Partial EM + search through model space
Table 3.1: Four cases for BN learning problems
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3.1.2 Autoencoder
Ian Goodfellow et al.[39] explains Deep Learning as ”a subset of Machine Learning that
achieves great power and flexibility by learning to represent the world as nested hierarchy
of concepts, with each concept defined in relation to simpler concepts, and more abstract
representations computed in terms of less abstract ones”. Deep learning techniques[57]
learn the mapping of input space to some output space incrementally through its hidden
layer architecture, defining low-level features (such as words in text, peripheral edges
of an object in image) and then higher level features (such as sentences in text, specific
entities in the image). Each hidden unit of a trained deep learning network represents
one aspect of the whole and together they help represent the mapping from input space
to final output space.
One of the deep learning networks used for the task of representation learning in
an unsupervised manner is Autoencoders [53]. Autoencoders are the deep learning
models which aim to understand the representation of the data by trying to reconstruct
it. Figure 3.2 shows the simplest auto-encoder which has a multi-layer perceptron
(MLP) - like structure with one hidden layer. The difference between an MLP and
an autoencoder is that the output layer in the autoencoder has the same cardinality
of its input layer whilst the cardinality of the output layer in an MLP is the number
of classes the perceptron should be capable of classifying. The motivation for this
architecture is that hidden layer represents latent features [4] which, in other words, are
the representation of the input in smaller latent space. Hence, an autoencoder plays an
important role in dimensionality reduction: after the training phase, the output layer is
usually thrown away and the encoder network is used to build a new dataset of samples
with lower dimensions.
Formal Definition
Formally, for a kth input vector xk, w1 and b1 represent the weights and bias of en-
coder network E, and w2 and b2 represent the weights and bias of the decoder network
D. A simple encoder could be represented as a network such that D(E(x)) = x. En-
coder network E learns a stochastic mapping from input vector x to hidden vector
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h as pencoder(h|x). Similarly, decoder network’s task is to learn the reverse stochas-
tic mapping as pdecoder(x˜|h) where x˜ represents generated input. Just like any deep
learning network, autoencoders are also trained using gradient descent technique where
gradients are getting updated using backpropagation. The feed-forward computation in
autoencoder can be mathematically written as follows:
h1 = a(w1x+ b1)
h2 = a(w2h1 + b2)
.
.
.
x˜ = a(wnhn−1 + bn)
where a is an activation function. The loss function for an autoencoder can be defined
as follows:
L(x,D(E(x)) =
1
2
∑
k
(x˜k − xk)2 (3.5)
where, hidden layer h for an autoencoder with single hidden layer (as shown in figure
3.2) is computed as
E(x) = h = a(xk.w1 + b1) (3.6)
where a represents some activation function, and output layer x˜ can be generated as
D(h) = xˆ = a(h.w2 + b2) (3.7)
Here, x˜k is the k
th generated input and xk is the k
th real input and L represents total
squared reconstruction error.
3.2 Addressing limitations
Bayesian Network is a suitable machine learning model in many applications for various
reasons [64]. One, Bayesian Network can give good generalization error even with fewer
19
Figure 3.2: Autoencoder with one hidden layer illustrating its two components: encoder
and decoder
data. Two, Bayesian Network work even when the data is missing [52] which makes it a
popular model for data imputation or interpolation [43] [23] as it encodes all variables.
Three, Bayesian Network is very powerful for it can also learn the best structure [44] to
represent the conditional dependence among the features. This improves the explain-
ability aspect of the model. Four, because it learns the dependence of variables on each
other, it can also be used for causal inference urther helping in understanding the prob-
lem domain better. In fact, one can compute consequences given a cause and vice versa.
This is done by calculating the probability of distributions of child nodes given parent
nodes and vice versa. Five, Bayesian Network can be quick in answering queries once
the model learns the structure and parameters as it contains the conditional probability
distribution for every feature per every possible combination of its parent features.
However, Bayesian Network has several limitations [18], especially in the domain of
collective anomaly detection when the anomalies are subtly anomalous when considered
individually. We divide these limitations into 4 categories and explain each category of
limitation and how they can be overcome by autoencoders.
First, Bayesian Networks work best with discrete variables. However, most of the
real world data is continuous or a combination of discrete and continuous variables.
Many techniques have been developed to deal with continuous variables. One such type
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is discretization of continuous variables into intervals [30] [47] (i.e. changing continu-
ous data into multinomial data). However, discretization might lead to some loss of
information and Bayesian Network might end up learning approximate characteristics
of the true distribution model. This might make the Bayesian Network lose its sta-
tistical capability to detect subtle anomalies. Another type of approach is using naive
bayesian structure [66], and then learn the distribution in a non-parametric way. Some
techniques deal with continuous variables directly by assuming a certain distribution
for every node in the network [37] and then learning its parameters. Real world data
is too complex and such probabilistic assumptions might not often be true leading to
loosely learned probability distribution. These techniques do not learn the true char-
acteristics of the data [15] because of various assumptions which might be significant
in detecting anomalies especially if they are subtly anomalous. On the other hand, au-
toencoder is a non-parametric deep learning model that doesn’t assume anything about
the data and can directly work with continuous data. Hence, it ends up learning the
true characteristics of the data with more confidence.
Second, in order for Bayesian Network to be effective, the data must have some
structure in it in terms of features being well defined. However, most real world data
is unstructured. Furthermore, Bayesian Network needs to be pre-fed with extracted
meaningful features [51] [60]. On the other hand, autoencoder can directly work with
raw unstructured data. For example, for detecting heart irregularities through its sound,
one needs to compute features such as audio signal type, strength, duration of the sound,
frequency, etc. to come up with a structure in order to use Bayesian Network whereas
audio signals can be directly fed to an autoencoder which can learn the probability
distribution of the sound. For unstructured data, learning latent variables becomes
extremely important in order to learn a better approximation of the true distribution
of the data. However, it is difficult to learn latent variables using Bayesian Networks.
Even though there are many techniques [16] [54] which can make Bayesian Networks
learn latent variables, one needs to specify information such as the number of hidden
variables, cardinality of each hidden node, etc. Identifying all possible combination
of random variables is exponential [26] and hence, providing an optimal number of
variables is challenging. Autoencoders, on the other end automatically learn latent
variables representing significant features in hidden layers. This is convenient when the
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underlying anomalous process is only subtly anomalous and can only be distinguished
in latent space. Also, Bayesian Networks are not effective in learning high dimensional
unstructured data such as images, genomic data, etc. As the dimension increases,
the efficacy of Bayesian Network in learning conditional dependence among features
decreases. Several techniques that use Bayesian Network to work with images, audio,
etc., require extraction of meaningful features [50]. On the other, Autoencoder can work
with such high dimensional data as it learns significant features given a large number of
features and then anomalies can be detected based only on the small set of significant
latent features learned.
Third, the power of Bayesian Network depends heavily on the structure learned.
However, defining and learning the structure which represents the true data is a difficult
task [13]. In order to provide good priors to the network, expert knowledge [42] is needed
for modeling Bayesian Network. For instance, initial order of variables that are needed
to be learned, subjective probability of a given variable to be the parent of another
variable [55] for the nodes keeping the order of nodes specified under consideration,
etc. Such knowledge is hard to be specified by an expert. Even though there are
techniques developed for obtaining such prior knowledge based on statistical property
of the data, it still relies on approximate assumptions. Such assumptions might give
away crucial information making it hard to identify slightly anomalous records. On the
other hand, autoencoder doesn’t assume anything in prior and instead starts with a
randomly initialized weights and other defined hyperparameters and then tries to fit
the data to that structure by updating weights, learning the statistical distribution that
closely matches with the true distribution. Also, Bayesian Networks fail to learn the
cyclic dependency among variables (for example, A depends B and B depends on A)
and hence, can not learn the correlation between variables or combination of variables.
In order for Bayesian Networks to learn the conditional dependence among features, all
features must obey local markov property [5]. In fact, the structure learning problem
itself is an N-P Complete problem. Though some techniques exist to relax the time
complexity, they either follow a greedy approach based on some heuristics [56] [63] or
restrict the space of models. In both cases, it might miss the best structure possible
and learn an approximate model with high bias. Autoencoders, being a variant of
Artificial Neural Network (ANN) which acts as a universal approximator [38], can learn
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any structure without any restrictions like the absence of cyclic dependency, etc. This
enables autoencoder to capture all dependencies and correlations in the data which
might then make the detection of subtle collective anomalies efficient.
Four, there are several issues in training a Bayesian Network. One such issue is
that learning the structure and parameters together is an NP-Complete problem [12].
This is because the objective function of the Bayesian Network is not a convex function.
Although techniques [34] have been developed to make the objective function convex, it
makes too many assumptions and as a result, the final learned model could actually be
worse compared to the one obtained without the convex function. On the other hand, the
objective function of autoencoders is based on the squared reconstruction error which is
convex (refer equation 3.5). Also, in order to achieve good accuracy, Bayesian Network
must learn all conditional dependencies among all variables. This might increase the
model’s complexity drastically. One can say, as the accuracy increases, complexity could
also increase. However, in case of autoencoder, one can fix the model’s complexity by
various hyper-parameters like activation functions, number of hidden layers, number of
hidden units in each layer, etc. And using gradient descent, it learns the best weights
to fit the probability distribution and achieve desirable accuracy. From the qualitative
perspective, one cannot justify how close the learned model is from true distribution
because during the training process of Bayesian Network, the directions of dependence
among variables might change multiple times and stop at a sub-optimal model. It can
not be predicted if continuing the training process to next step gives a better model or
worse. On the other hand, autoencoder’s training process involves finding a good local
minima in a convex objective function using gradient descent and hence gives an idea of
how far the given model is from the true model based on how soon the training process
is halted.
There are many other limitations of Bayesian Network such as a Bayesian Network
cannot be applied in an online setting. Generally, a block of data is given to the learning
algorithm to learn the structure and its parameters. On the other hand, autoencoder
being a deep learning network can be trained by providing one sample at a time using
stochastic gradient descent with batch size being 1 and hence, can be used in an online
setting. However, we will not be focussing on such limitations in this thesis.
Chapter 4
Proposed Solution
We employ a deep autoencoder network to learn the probability distribution of the
data. More specifically, we use autoencoder to learn the hidden significant features
in the normal data records under the H0. Using these hidden features, autoencoder
then reconstructs the input and provides reconstruction error for that particular input.
We then convert these reconstruction errors into empirical p-value ranges and then run
FGSS on them to get a subset S such that F (S) is maximum.
4.1 Property of reconstruction error
An autoencoder learns the significant features hidden in the latent space and recon-
structs the input from those features with some errors. These reconstruction errors
are independent and follow a normal distribution even though attributes are correlated.
For one dimensional input, the magnitude of the reconstruction error tells how anoma-
lous that input is. For multivariate input, one way to find out the anomalousness of
the input instance is the summation of reconstruction errors across all attributes for
that input. However, we focus on individual attribute’s reconstruction error because
our approach not only detects anomalous records but also provides information of the
attributes whose reconstruction errors are unexpectedly high under H0.
First, we split the dataset containing only normal records into two sets, Datamodel
and Dataexp. We train the autoencoder on Datamodel to learn the probability dis-
tribution of the normal process that generated those records. Then, we generate the
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reconstruction errors by feeding the Dataexp to autoencoder. Let xij and x˜ij represent
the jth attribute of iith record for the original input xi ∈ Dataexp and reconstructed
input x˜i respectively, where j ∈ [1,m] for m attributes, reconstruction vector ri can be
represented as follows:
ri =< ri1, ri2, ..., rij , ..., rim >= (xi − x˜i)2 (4.1)
where,
xi =< xi1, xi2, ..., xij , ..., xim > (4.2)
x˜i =< x˜i1, x˜i2, ..., x˜ij , ..., x˜im > (4.3)
Here, rij indicates how likely is it to observe an attribute value for attribute j for
given record xi. Higher the reconstruction error rij , the more anomalous that attribute
value is for the record.
4.2 p-value ranges
While performing the hypothesis test in statistics, the p-value helps to determine the
significance of the results. A p-value is a measure of the evidence against the null hy-
pothesis. Lower p-value (typically ≤ 0.05) indicates a stronger evidence against the null
hypothesis, hence we reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis.
In the case of anomaly detection, a null hypothesis states that there are no anomalies
present in the data and an alternative hypothesis states that the data contains anoma-
lies. Typically, a lesser p-value for an instance indicates that the instance is an anomaly.
For example, in Bayesian network [45], lesser p-value indicates lesser likelihood of that
data instance under H0. However, in autoencoder, anomalous data instances tend to
have higher reconstruction error under H0. Thus, we define p-value metric such that
higher reconstruction errors correspond to lower p-values.
In order to compute the p-value, we first split the data containing no anomalies
into Datamodel and Dataexp, train the autoencoder on Datamodel and calculate the
reconstruction errors on Dataexp. These reconstruction errors represent the distribution
of the errors of each attribute under H0, represented by rij . Now, we take the test data
DataTest which contains some anomalies and calculate reconstruction errors using the
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trained autoencoder under H0. Let r
t
ij represent the reconstruction error of j
th attribute
of ith test record.
Traditionally, an empirical p-value for jth attribute of ith test record can be computed
as
pij = p(r
t
ij) =
1
n
Ntrain∑
k=1
I(rkj ≥ rtij) (4.4)
where Ntrain denotes the total number of samples in Dataexp. One can note that at-
tributes which are anomalous will have lower pij because of corresponding reconstruction
error rtij being larger. Apart from the test records having some true distribution, the
reconstruction error rj of an attribute j also has some distribution of reconstruction
errors under H0. Since we know that Dataexp contains no anomalies in it, an empirical
cumulative distribution function can be calculated using equation 4.4. If Datatest has
no anomalies present in it, then rtij is from the same distribution as rij . In this case,
pij asymptotically follows a uniform distribution(0,1) for each j ∈ [1,m]. If Datatest
has few records which are slightly anomalous, then pij will not follow uniform distri-
bution(0,1) under H0. Similarly, the attribute which has slightly anomalous values for
some records are also not distributed as Uniform(0,1). This helps in getting insights
about the attribute values which are slightly anomalous under H0.
McFowland et al. [45] suggested to use empirical p-value ranges instead of p-values
to avoid the bias towards larger p-values when there is a chance of having tied likelihood
values in the case of Bayesian networks, in our case, tied reconstruction error values. For
example, consider a column j with all identical values. It will result in pij = 1 for each
record hence making it significant at some α. However, having all rtij with identical
values and similar to rij should not result in significant p-values. The occurrence of
this scenario is really low when the attributes are continuous. However, for discrete
attributes (for eg. xij=0 for some xi), the autoencoder might reconstruct the exact
same value for that attribute, xtij resulting in identical p values. This leads to ties in
reconstruction errors. Since most of the dataset might contain a mixture of continuous
and discrete attributes, it is safer to use empirical p-value ranges compared to p-values.
To compute p-value range for the reconstruction error of jth attribute of ith record,
26
we compute two terms
Nbeat(r
t
ij) =
Ntrain∑
k=1
I(rtij < rkj) (4.5)
Ntie(r
t
ij) =
Ntrain∑
k=1
I(rtij = rkj) (4.6)
Then, p-value range is a range bounded by two terms pmin and pmax i.e. [pmin(pij),
pmax(pij)] where,
pmin(pij) =
Nbeat(r
t
ij)
Ntrain + 1
(4.7)
pmax(pij) =
Nbeat(r
t
ij) +Ntie(r
t
ij) + 1
Ntrain + 1
(4.8)
Once we have empirical p-value ranges for each rtij , we can draw an empirical p-value
from this range and if Datatest and Dataexp were from same distribution i.e. no anoma-
lies were present in Datatest, then the drawn empirical p-values will be asymptotically
distributed as Uniform(0,1). With reference to the example of identical column values
mentioned before, this approach would lead to Nbeat(r
t
ij) = 0 and Ntie(r
t
ij) = 1. Hence,
this will result into an empirical p-value range of (0,1), and randomly drawing a p-value
from this range would result into Uniform(0,1) which verifies our intuition.
4.3 Testing Hypothesis
To carry out statistical hypothesis testing, we need to find a significance level α which
is the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true. Typically, to detect
whether a uni-variate data point is drawn from a given distribution, we first compute
the p-value of that data point under the null hypothesis that the data point belongs
to the given distribution. Then, at a particular significance level α, we reject the null
hypothesis if p-value < α or p-value > 1 − α. We define the significance of a given
p-value as
psig = I(p < α or p > 1− α) (4.9)
In our approach, in order to determine whether a given subset is generated from an
anomalous process, we first calculate p-value range for that subset. Then, we determine
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the proportion of p-value range significant at α. In other words, the probability of a
value drawn from [pmin(pij),pmax(pij)] is < α or > (1− α). In case of an autoencoder,
anomalous records or attributes tend to have higher reconstruction error under H0 lead-
ing to lower p-values. In other words, for the anomalous set of records, attributes which
are anomalous have their corresponding pij < α. Hence, we determine the significance
of th jth attribute of ith record as follows:
psig(pij) =

0 if pmin(pij) > α
1 if pmax(pij) < α
α−pmin(pij)
pmax(pij)−pmin(pij) otherwise
Then, significance of the subset S = RS × AS can be determined by adding all the
significance values in the subset as follows:
psig(S) =
∑
i∈RS
∑
j∈AS
psig(pij) (4.10)
If we were considering a uni-variate data point such as psig(pij), we reject H0 if
psig(pij) < α. However, in order to carry out hypothesis testing over the entire subset
S, we first compute the expected count of psig(pij) ∈ psig(S) significant at α as
pexp(S) = α×NS , where NS =
∑
i∈RS
∑
j∈AS
1 (4.11)
Informally, psig(S) denotes the observed number of p-value ranges in a subset S that
are significant at α. Each p-value range is determined by the proportion of the range
significant at α. On the other hand, pexp(S) denotes the expected number of p-value
ranges in a subset S that should be significant at α. Based on these two terms, we reject
null hypothesis H0, if psig(S) > pexp(S), otherwise we assume that the subset contains
normal records.
4.4 Metric to determine atypicality of subets
If the autoencoder is perfectly trained ( i.e. it has learned the true typical characteristics
of the normal records), it would be able to reconstruct the records with 0 reconstruc-
tion error. However, for the anomalous records, the attributes which diverge more from
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normal behavior tend to have higher reconstruction errors. We can note that the atypi-
cality of the attribute value is measured by how far it’s reconstruction error is from the
true expected value i.e. 0. Similarly, in order to determine the atypicality of the subset,
we employ a non-parametric scan statistic called as the Berk Jones (BJ) statistic [6].
The BJ statistic for a given S gives us a score which indicates the divergence of the
subset from the normal behavior. This divergence depends on the number of significant
p-value ranges in the subset S. Formally, we employ the BJ statistic for a given S as
follows:
τS = ΦBJ(psig(S), NS , α) = NS ×K(psig
NS
, α) (4.12)
where K measures the Kullback-Liebler divergence between the observed proportion of
significant p-values at α i.e.
psig
NS
and expected proportion of p-values i.e. α.
Once we compute all the candidate subsets, the algorithm should calculate τS ∀ S,
and then returns the most anomalous subset S∗ such that τS∗ is maximum. However,
computing all possible candidate subsets is exponential in N , and is infeasible for even
moderately sized datasets.
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Algorithm 1 Deep FGSS
1. Given Training dataset Dtrain, Testing dataset Dtest
2. Split Dtrain into Datamodel and Dataexp
3. Train Autoencoder on Dmodel
4. Compute reconstruction error matrix Eexp = {rij}
5. Compute reconstruction error matrix Etest = {rtij}
6. Compute p-value matrix P = {pij}
7. For each Ri, form search group SGi = {Rj}
8. For each SGg where g ∈ (1, G) and G denotes total
number of search groups
(a) Repeat for β number of iterations
i. Initialize A ← random set of {Aj}
ii. Repeat until convergence:
A. Set R = maxR′ F (R
′ ×A)
B. Set A = maxA′ F (R×A
′
)
iii. Set Sg = R
∗ ×A∗
9. Output S∗ = maxSg F (Sg)
4.5 Efficient Search Technique
In order to resolve the issue of exponential time complexity of computing all possible
subsets, most of the anomalous pattern detection techniques put some restrictions in
the search space or follow a greedy approach to find the best set of subsets. Hence,
these techniques might miss the most anomalous subset present in the dataset. Also,
these techniques do not scale well with the size of the dataset, making it infeasible for
larger datasets.
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Daniel B. Neill [48] devised LTSS property which enables searching only N of the
2N possible subsets of records and still provides us the guarantee of finding the most
anomalous subset. The LTSS property states that If we have a scoring function F (S)
to maximize over all subsets of records, and a ranking function G(Ri) which assigns a
rank Γi ∈ (1, N) to Ri, the subset S∗ with the maximum score F (S∗) consists of the
top-k ranked records. In our case we have
F (S) = τS (4.13)
G(Ri) =
∑
j∈(1,M)
psig(pij) (4.14)
The intuition behind the above ranking function is that the anomalous records tend
to have larger reconstruction error rij for some of the attributes, and inturn a larger
reconstruction error ri for the entire record. This results in a larger number of significant
p-value ranges at level α for that record. This leads to a higher G(Ri) value for the more
anomalous record than the record which is slightly lesser anomalous. The records which
are not generated by any anomalous process will have very fewer or no significant p-
value ranges leading to lower G(Ri) values. If we sort all the records in descending order
based on their corresponding G(Ri) values, we can form the subset S
(k) = R(k)×A in a
smarter way by including only the set of top-k ranked records R(k) = {Ri} ∀ Γi ∈ (1, k)
such that F (S(k)) > F (S(k+1)). This happens when the (k+1)th ranked record has zero
or very less number of significant p-value ranges and is likely a normal record. Hence,
intuitively all the subsequently lower ranked records with Γi ≥ k + 1 are also likely to
be generated by the normal process.
This way we can find the most anomalous subset of records given all the attributes.
In order to identify the most anomalous subset of columns for a given set of records, we
can perform the same optimization step for columns. For the given set of records, we can
rank all the columns according to their corresponding values of G(Aj) and incorporate
only the top-k attributes in the subset S(k
′
) = R×A(k′ ) where A(k′ ) = {Aj} ∀ Γj ∈ (1, k)
such that F (S(k
′
)) > F (S(k
′
+1)). Note that, here Γj indicates the rank of the attribute
instead of record.
Formally, we define the above two optimization [36] steps for some α, total number
of records N and total number of columns M as follows:
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Step 1: For the set of columns Aj for j ∈ (1,M), rank all the records Ri for i ∈ (1, N)
using the ranking function as
G(Ri) =
∑
j∈(1,M)
psig(pij) (4.15)
and then find R(k) = {Rl : Γl ∈ (1, k)} such that F (R(k) ×A) > F (R(k+1) ×A)
Step 2: For the set of rows Ri for i ∈ (1, N), rank all the columns Aj for j ∈ (1,M)
using the ranking function as
G(Aj) =
∑
i∈(1,N)
psig(pij) (4.16)
and then find A(k) = {Al : Γl ∈ (1, k)} such that F (R×A(k)) > F (R×A(k+1))
Once we find R(k) in the Step 1, we set R = R(k). Step 2 gives A(k) for the current set
of records R. We then set A = A(k). We repeat the above two steps alternatively and
at the end of every iteration we keep getting a better set of records and columns which
maximizes F (S). We stop this alternative process until we find the most optimal subset
S∗ = R∗×A∗ such that F (S∗) is maximum. Intuitively, we treat the entire data as the
subset and keep shortening the subset by removing a set of records and columns. The
criteria for the removal is that the difference between the observed number and expected
number of significant p-value ranges should increase. This repeats until it converges i.e.
when the difference is maximum. At this point, we obtain the most anomalous subset
in the entire dataset. Note that we always start the alternating optimization process
with a random set of columns or records. Hence, we repeat this convergence process for
different random initialization and return the subset with a maximum score among all
such iterations.
The underlying assumption is that all normal records are generated by a single back-
ground process and we learn the characteristics of this process using autoencoder under
H0. Also, there is a separate anomalous process that generates anomalous records whose
characteristics are different compared to the normal process. We can take advantage of
such a disparity by inducing similarity constraint to group similar records. We then run
the above optimization process within each group. This will return not only the most
optimal subset but also ensures that all the detected records have self-similar charac-
teristics. Another advantage of enforcing a similarity constraint is that in the presence
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of different types of anomalies, it will ensure that the detected subset contains all the
records that belong to a single anomaly type. Different types of anomalies are generated
by their corresponding anomalous processes which differ slightly from each other. To
compute the similarity between two records, we can use metrics like Euclidean distance,
Correlation-coefficient, Cosine similarity, etc. Formally, a search group for a record Ri of
radius r can be defined as {Rj : d(Ri, Rj) ≤ r} where d measures the similarity between
two data records. We can choose r depending on how strictly we want to enforce the
similarity constraint. Also, one should be careful in choosing the metric as it depends
on the input type. For instance, choosing Euclidean distance as the distance metric
for images might not be suitable. A similarity metric should give a high value while
comparing two normal records and a low value if we compare a normal record with an
anomalous record.
4.6 DeepFGSS Algorithm
DeepFGSS algorithm is an extension of the original FGSS algorithm [45] developed by
McFowland et al. which uses deep networks like autoencoders to enable FGSS to work
with high dimensional unstructured data with both discrete and continuous attributes.
Note that DeepFGSS works not only with autoencoder but any deep neural network
architecture for learning the probability distribution under the null hypothesis.
We illustrate the main steps of DeepFGSS in algorithm 1. We first split the training
data that contains no anomalies into two parts: Datamodel and Dataexp and train
autoencoder on Datamodel to learn the probability distribution of normal records under
the null hypothesis H0 that no anomalies are present. We then calculate reconstruction
error of Dataexp as Eexp which represents the expected distribution of reconstruction
errors of data under H0. We also calculate reconstruction errors of the Datatest as Etest
and then, compute p-value ranges for the reconstruction errors of each record’s attribute
value rtij ∈ Etest by comparing it with the reconstruction errors rij ∈ Eexp ∀i ∈ (1, N)
of the same column j. We then randomly draw a p-value pij ∈ Uniform[pmin(pij),
pmax(pij)] for all the attributes for each record. Optionally, we can enforce similarity
constraints by forming search groups for each Ri in Datatest using some distance metric
d and radius r. Then, we can run the two alternating optimization steps within each
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search group and identify the most anomalous subset in that search group as Sg. The
algorithm then returns the subset Sg with maximum BJ statistic score F (Sg) as S
∗.
Note that, unlike FGSS, there is an additional requirement in DeepFGSS to store
the distribution of the normal data Eexp along with the trained model which represents
the expected probability distribution of the normal data. Autoencoder maps the raw
input space to the probability distribution space of reconstruction errors.
There are various parameters that can be manually tuned in DeepFGSS. In order
to choose the significance level α, one can consider all the unique reconstruction error
values in the test dataset within some αmax and run the optimization steps for each of
the unique α ≤ αmax. The value of the αmax can be set depending on the disparity
between anomalous and normal records. Anomalies which are easily detectable lie on
the extreme corners when you plot the distribution of the normal records. However,
anomalies which are slightly anomalous, when considered individually, tend to share
many characteristics with the normal records and hence do not necessarily lie on the
extreme ends of the distribution. Also, one can choose any distance metric d depending
on the data and radius r depending on how small/strict the neighborhood should be.
Apart from these, if we have some prior expert knowledge of the data, we can add tweaks
such as the minimum or the maximum number of records a neighborhood can have. We
can also choose other non-parametric scan statistics such as the Higher Criticism (HC)
[25] statistics which can determine the similarity between two subsets. Along with these
parameters, the deep learning model itself can be treated as a parameter where one can
choose models such as Bidirectional Generative Adversarial Network [24] , Long Short
Term Memory [7] for time series data, etc. We do not employ any other model in this
thesis but the similar idea can be extended to other deep learning models and use FGSS
on top of it.
4.7 Computational Complexity
The most critical challenge in anomalous pattern detection is the infeasibility of eval-
uating all the possible subsets of the dataset. Even for a moderately sized dataset
consisting of N records and M attributes, there are a total number of 2N × 2M possible
subsets.
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FGSS takes advantage of LTSS property to reduce the problem of evaluating all
subsets from O(2N × 2M ) to O(N). To compute ranks for each record, we need to
sum over the psig of all the attributes in O(M) complexity for each record leading
to O(NM) for all records. After computing the ranks for all the records, sorting them
takes O(N logN). The worse case time complexity for evaluating top-k ranked subsets is
O(N). Similarly, for ranking each column, computing psig for all records takes O(MN)
and sorting them takes O(M logM). Hence, evaluating top-k ranked subsets of columns
takes the worst case time complexity of O(M). Each single optimization run comprises
of maximizing over both records and columns that takes time complexity of
O(NM) +O(N logN) +O(N) +O(MN) +O(M logM) +O(M) =
O(NM +N logN +M logM)
(4.17)
Considering γ is the average number of times the optimization ran before converging
for each β number of iterations, and u is number of unique alpha values ≤ αmax, the
total time complexity becomes
u× β × γ ×O(NM +N logN +M logM) = O(uβγ(NM +N logN +M logM)) (4.18)
On enforcing similarity constraints, FGSS runs within each neighborhood. The max-
imum number of neighborhoods possible is N with k being the maximum number of
records a neighborhood can be comprised of. In case of constrained FGSS, total time
complexity across all neighborhood becomes
O(uβγN(kM + klogk +M logM)) (4.19)
Note that the above time complexity is still less than O(2N×2M ). Also, one can enforce
stricter constraints on the number of neighborhoods, minimum/maximum neighborhood
size (k) and number of unique alpha values (u) to improve the running time with a
reduced chance of finding the most optimal subset.
Chapter 5
Evaluations
In this section, we explain the performance of DeepFGSS on two datasets: network
intrusion and handwritten digits. We evaluate the performance in two ways. One, we
measure the efficiency of how well DeepFGSS can distinguish between datasets contain-
ing and not containing anomalies. We plot power curve and ROC curve for evaluating
this measure. The other performance metric determines how well DeepFGSS can detect
anomalies in the dataset. We plot jaccard curve and precision-recall curve for determin-
ing the detection accuracy. We compute these metrics for varying dataset sizes, namely
100, 250, 500, 750 and 1000 with varying proportion of anomalies, namely 0%, 3%, 6%,
9%, 12% and 15%.
5.1 Experiments
5.1.1 Power curve
Power of an algorithm is defined as the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when
it is false. In our case, null hypothesis H0 represents no anomalies are present in the
dataset and alternative hypothesis H1 represents the dataset contains some anomalies.
Mathematically, power can be defined as follows:
power = p(reject H0 |H1 is true) (5.1)
Power of DeepFGSS depends on three primary factors: significance criterion, size of the
dataset and the proportion of anomalous records. We study the power of DeepFGSS
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at a significance criterion, αp = 0.05, for dataset size N varying as 100, 250, 500, 750
and 1000 with proportion of anomalies prop increasing as 0%, 3%, 6%, 9%, 12% and
15%. To calculate the power at a given N and prop, we first randomly draw 100 datasets
Dnormal consisting of N number of records with no anomalies in it and 10 datasets Dtest
of N number of records with prop % anomalies in it and calculate the dataset score for
each of them. We define the dataset score as the score of the most anomalous subset
found in that dataset i.e.
τDi = τS∗⊆Di (5.2)
where S∗ is the most anomalous subset in ith drawn dataset Di. We then compute the
power of DeepFGSS for Dtest at a given dataset size N and proportion of anomalies
prop as follows:
Oibeats =
100∑
j=1
I(τDitest > τDjnormal
)
Ebeats = 100× (1− αp)
power(Dtest) =
∑10
i=1 I(O
i
beats > Ebeats)
10
Here, Obeats is the observed number of times the score of the anomalous dataset is
greater than scores of normal datasets drawn whereas Ebeats is the expected number
of times the score of the anomalous dataset must be greater than the scores of normal
datasets drawn.
Informally, power of the DeepFGSS tells what should be the minimum proportion of
anomalies in order for the algorithm to perform well for a given dataset size at a given
significance criterion. For example, a power of 0.7 means that 7/10 times DeepFGSS
is able to detect anomalous subsets (which makes the score of the dataset higher) in a
given sized dataset and given proportion of anomalies.
5.1.2 ROC curve
In this experiment, we treat the task of distinguishing normal and anomalous datasets
as a binary classification problem and plot Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
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curve. In our case,
True Positive Rate(TPR) = Proportion of anomalous datasets detected as anomalous
False Positive Rate(FPR) = Proportion of normal datasets detected as anomalous
The ROC curve signifies the the ability of DeepFGSS algorithm to differentiate between
anomalous and normal datasets as its discriminating dataset score’s threshold is varied.
Area under the ROC curve determines the probability of ranking anomalous datasets
higher than the normal datasets. In other words, we will obtain a higher area under the
curve when DeepFGSS assigns high scores to anomalous datasets compared to normal
datasets. Also, it is worth noting the fact that the power curve tells about the power of
DeepFGSS for a given dataset size and proportion of anomalies at a fixed significance
criterion αp. However, ROC curve tells about the efficiency of DeepFGSS for a given
dataset size and proportion of anomalies as we vary αp because αp is equivalent to the
false positive rate.
To plot ROC curve, we randomly draw 5 sample datasets from the normal datasets
under H0 and 5 sample datasets of size N containing prop % anomalies in it. We then
compute scores for all 10 datasets and compute TPR and FPR at varying threshold
values and then plot ROC curve and compute the area under that curve.
5.1.3 Jaccard curve
In order to evaluate how well DeepFGSS is identifying the anomalies as a subset, we
evaluated the accuracy within the detected subset using the Jaccard index. Jaccard
index (also called as the Jaccard similarity coefficient) is simply a ratio of the size of
the intersection to the size of the union. Jaccard index, in other words, is a measure of
the similarity between two sample sets.
We use Jaccard index to evaluate the similarity between how the predicted set of
anomalous records and the actual set of anomalous records as we increase the proportion
of anomalies in the dataset. To compute Jaccard index, we define two sets T a and T p
of size N as follows:
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T ai =
1, if Rti is anomaly0, otherwise
T pi =
1, if Rti ∈ S∗0, otherwise
and, then compute Jaccard index as follows:
J =
∑N
i I(T
a
i = 1 and T
p
i = 1)∑N
i I(T
a
i = 1 or T
p
i = 1)
(5.3)
We compute J for a given dataset size N with prop increasing as 0%, 3%, 6%, 9%, 12%
and 15%. We generate 5 jaccard curve plots each for N = 100, 250, 500, 750 and 1000.
5.1.4 Precision-Recall curve
Another way to assess the quality of the subset detected by DeepFGSS is by evaluating
how well it ranks more anomalous subsets over less anomalous subsets. To evaluate
this, we obtain 5 most anomalous subsets and assign each record a score that is a
summation of two terms: the score of the subset that it belongs to (otherwise 0) and
its reconstruction error. Formally, we can write the score of the record Ri as:
L(Ri) = τS +
M∑
j=1
rij where Ri ∈ S (5.4)
The idea being all subsets are first ranked based on the subset scores τS and then all
records within the subset S are ranked based on their individual record’s reconstruction
ri. This scoring metric allows records to have higher score either because they are similar
to other anomalous records or are individually anomalous. Also, it helps in detecting
For Ri 6∈ {S1, S2, S3, S4, S5}, where Si is ith most anomalous subset, L(Ri) = 0. We
then compute precision and recall at various thresholds and plot the precision-recall
curve for N = 100, 250, 500, 750 and 1000, and prop = 0%, 3%, 6%, 9%, 12% and
15%. We then report the area under precision-recall curve. Higher area indicates that
DeepFGSS is able to rank more anomalous subsets higher than less anomalous subsets
within a dataset. Within the ranked subset, DeepFGSS is ranking more anomalous
records higher than the less anomalous records.
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5.2 Datasets
5.2.1 Network Intrusion
We use KDD Dataset [17] which is a famous benchmark dataset in the field of Network
Intrusion Detection. This was developed as part of The Third International Knowl-
edge Discovery and Data Mining Tools Competition to build a system which can detect
bad connections (called as intrusions or attacks) in a simulated military network en-
vironment. KDD training dataset contains approximately 4,000,000 single connection
records. Each connection record consists of 41 features and a label. These 41 features
include basic characteristics of an individual TCP connection like protocol type, du-
ration, total bytes transferred etc; domain specific features like total number of failed
login attempts, total number of operations to create file etc or; traffic features computed
in a two second time window like count of the connections to the same host or same
service or to different hosts etc. There is a total of 7 discrete and 34 continuous features.
FGSS requires all the continuous features to be discretized into 5 levels losing crucial
characteristics of 34 out of 41 features. On the other hand, DeepFGSS directly works
on continuous and discrete variables. We have selected two of the common attacks for
our evaluation: Apache2 and Neptune.
We use autoencoder with 3 hidden layers. The first and third hidden layers contain
10 units and the second layer contains 5 units. We used ReLU activation function and
RMSProp optimizer to train the model at a learning rate of 0.001, batch size of 50 and
20000 epochs. We also used Euclidean distance to enforce similarity constraints with a
mean of the Euclidean distance between any two instances as the radius.
Figure 5.1 shows the power curves for different dataset sizes showing how the average
power of DeepFGSS changes with an increase in the proportion of anomalies. DeepFGSS
is able to distinguish datasets perfectly at 12% anomalies or greater for Apache2 and
6% or greater for Neptune. Also, the steady increase in power is also proportional to the
size of the dataset. It is clearer in the case of Apache2. When the proportion of anomaly
is 9%, power is 0.2 for dataset size of 100 records and 250 records, then power grows
to 0.25 for dataset size of 500 records, 0.3 for dataset size of 750 records and power
reaches 0.47 when the dataset contains 1000 records. For Neptune, at 6% there is a
slight increase in the power from 0.8 reaching 1.0 when the dataset contains at least 500
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records. At lower proportions of anomalies, the tendency of DeepFGSS to differentiate
between anomalous and normal datasets is very low. This is because DeepFGSS is
focussed on detecting the subset with maximum score τS and this score can be higher
for a larger subset even though it contains only normal records with each individual
record adding to τS . However, for larger proportions of anomalies, the smaller subsets
formed by anomalous records are sufficiently large to be detected as the most anomalous
subset leading to a higher power value. Minor errors in the power values (for example at
smaller proportions of anomalies when N=100) can be due to the random sampling of
the datasets. We can conclude from figure 5.1 that it is easier to differentiate datasets
containing Neptune attacks than Apache2 attacks.
Figure 5.1: Power curves for KDD dataset for two types of anomalies: Apache2 and
Neptune
Figure 5.2.1 shows a heatmap of the area under the ROC curve for KDD dataset for
both the attack types. We observe similar trends through ROC curves that the ability of
DeepFGSS to rank anomalous datasets higher than normal datasets increases with the
increase in the proportion of anomalies. DeepFGSS can perfectly rank all the anomalous
datasets higher than all the normal datasets when the proportion of anomalies is greater
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than 12% in the case of Apache2 and 6% in the case of Neptune. Also, it is interesting
to note that for a fixed proportion of anomalies, the area under ROC curve increases
gradually with the increase in the dataset size.
Figure 5.2: Area under ROC for Apache2 Figure 5.3: Area under ROC for Neptune
Figure 5.4 shows the jaccard curve for different dataset sizes for both anomaly types.
As the proportion of anomalies increases, the average Jaccard index also increases. We
observe that the Jaccard index reaches around 0.8 at 12% anomalies in the case of
Apache2 and at 6% in the case of Neptune. The maximum value of Jaccard index is
observed to be around 0.85 and 0.95 for Apache2 and Neptune respectively. From our
experiments, we identified that the reason for the steady increase in the Jaccard index
is the increase in precision without much drop in the recall.
Figure 5.5 and 5.6 shows the precision-recall plots for the dataset size of 1000 records
for both Apache2 and Neptune, respectively. We can observe that precision starts from
low value for both Apache2 and Neptune at some cases. This indicates that sometimes
the highest ranked subset might contain mostly normal records. However, it is being
ranked high because of its size being large making the cumulative score of the entire
subset high. After this initial low precision, we see a sudden jump in the precision value.
This provides some confidence that the subsequently ranked subsets are the anomalous
ones containing records most of which are anomalies. Precision-recall plots for all other
dataset sizes can be found in Appendix A and Appendix B.
Figure 5.2.1 shows a heatmap of the area under precision-recall curve for KDD
dataset for both anomaly types. It can be clearly observed that the area under precision-
recall curve increases as the proportion of anomalies also increases. This is more evident
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Figure 5.4: Jaccard curves for KDD dataset for two types of anomalies: Apache2 and
Neptune
in the case of Apache2 attack type. DeepFGSS is able to rank the subsets and records
within the subset best when the proportion of anomalies is greater than 12% for Apache2
and 6% for Neptune. Also, since the area under precision-recall curve is not 1, it means
that some of the records in the detected subset are normal records but most of the
records are anomalous.
5.2.2 Handwritten Digits
The MNIST database is a famous benchmark dataset for testing machine learning per-
formance on images. It consists of 60,000 training and 100,000 test samples of hand-
written digits. Each record in the dataset is flattened out vector of pixel intensities of a
28 × 28 image. Each digit is labeled as one of the digits from 0-9 which tells the number
written in the image. For the anomaly detection dataset, we treat all the images of 0
digit as the training set under the H0 and all the images of digit 7 as anomalies. In
order to create test dataset, we inject some of the images from class 7 into the images
of class 0 and then run DeepFGSS on it.
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Figure 5.5: Precision-Recall curves for KDD dataset with N=1000 and Apache2 anomaly
We learned the distribution of the data belonging to the class 0 using the autoencoder
with the same architecture as we used for KDD dataset and learning rate of 0.001. We
use sigmoid activation function for learning the distribution of pixels after scaling all
the pixel values to 0-1 scale. We used a smaller batch size of 5 and 1000 epochs. We
did not enforce similarity constraints for this dataset.
We can see similar trends of increase in the power with the increase in the propor-
tion of anomalies (refer figure 5.9). DeepFGSS is able to differentiate between normal
datasets and anomalous datasets perfectly when 9% of the dataset is comprised of
anomalies at a size of 100 records and for larger datasets at least 6% anomalies. Also,
when the proportion of anomalies is 3%, the power grows steadily from 0.3 at dataset
size of 100 records to 0.8 when the number of records reaches 1000. This can be ex-
plained by a simple intuition that 3% of 1000 is greater than 3% of 100 leading to
a greater possibility of finding a larger dense subset comprising of a relatively large
number of anomalies.
From figure 5.10, we can observe that DeepFGSS is able to rank all the anomalous
datasets higher than the dataset containing no anomalies perfectly when there is at
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Figure 5.6: Precision-Recall curves for KDD dataset with N=1000 and Neptune anomaly
least 6% anomalies in it. For larger datasets, DeepFGSS can easily differentiate between
normal and anomalous datasets evident by higher AUC values. Also, at 3% anomalies,
we see an increase in AUC with the increase in the size of the dataset.
We can infer similar results from the jaccard curve plots for MNIST (refer figure
5.11). Also, the increase in the Jaccard index slightly becomes steady above 9% propor-
tion of anomalies in the dataset. It can be noted that the highest Jaccard index score
obtained among all dataset sizes is around 0.6 compared to a Jaccard index of 0.8 in
case of KDD dataset. This is because of not enforcing similarity constraints leading to
slightly lesser precision.
From the precision-recall plots for dataset size of 1000 records shown in figure 5.12,
we can infer similar trend as we have seen in the case of KDD dataset. Refer Appendix
C for precision-recall plots for other dataset sizes. Also, the heatmap shown in figure
5.13 shows a higher area under the precision-recall curve for all dataset sizes when the
proportion of anomalies is at least 9%. It can be noted that the area under precision-
recall curve here is slightly lesser compared to KDD dataset. This can be improved by
inducing similar constraints which can increase the precision of DeepFGSS by obtaining
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Figure 5.7: Area under Precision-Recall
curve for Apache2
Figure 5.8: Area under Precision-Recall
curve for Neptune
subsets in a smaller neighborhood.
From all the experiments, we can infer that the performance of DeepFGSS increases
with an increase in both dataset size and proportion of anomaly. Also, DeepFGSS
is able to perform sufficiently well at 12% anomalies for Apache2 and 6% anomalies
for Neptune in KDD dataset and 9% for images of digit 7 in MNIST dataset. Note
that FGSS is not able to work with MNIST dataset as it is a high dimensional and
unstructured data whereas DeepFGSS is able to predict anomalies in such a dataset
with sufficient accuracy.
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Figure 5.9: Power curves for MNIST dataset
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Figure 5.10: Area under ROC curve for MNIST dataset with different dataset size and
proportion of anomalies
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Figure 5.11: Jaccard curves for MNIST dataset
Figure 5.12: Precision-Recall curves for MNIST dataset for N=1000
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Figure 5.13: Area under Precision-Recall curve for MNIST dataset with different dataset
size and proportion of anomalies
Chapter 6
Conclusion and Discussion
In this thesis, we focus on the anomalous pattern detection technique. We first explain
various point anomaly detection techniques along with its limitations. We then mention
some of the recent collective anomaly detection techniques based on clustering and deep
learning that overcome the limitations of point anomaly detection techniques. However,
they fail in detecting anomalous patterns in the data as they focus only on a group of
records that collectively form an anomaly. APD, AGD, and FGSS are the three major
anomalous pattern detection techniques that provide a subset of records and attributes
which together do not conform to the expected behavior. We then propose a deep
learning based framework, called DeepFGSS, which extends the capabilities of FGSS
to work with continuous, unstructured and high dimensional data along with more
advantages. We evaluated it on both structured and unstructured datasets. We show
that DeepFGSS is able to distinguish normal datasets from the anomalous datasets
at smaller proportions of anomalies using power curves and ROC curves. We then
demonstrated that DeepFGSS is able to detect anomalous patterns with high accuracy
using precision-recall curves and Jaccard curves.
Currently, we have only evaluated the accuracy on the detection of anomalous
records. New approaches/metrics need to formed for evaluating the predicted set of
columns. Also, we have used the Berk Jones scan statistic to score subsets. We can
use various other scan statistics such as the Higher Criticism [25] etc and see if they
enhance the detection capability of DeepFGSS. We have used Autoencoder to compute
reconstruction errors which are then converted into empirical p-value ranges. We can
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use other deep learning networks such as Variational Autoencoders [40], Bi-directional
Generative Adversarial Networks [24] which learns the mapping of input data onto some
normal distribution. The values from the normal distribution corresponding to input
records can then be used to convert into empirical p-value ranges. Also, DeepFGSS is
currently being evaluated over datasets containing anomalies of a single type. Because it
has the capability of enforcing similarity constraints, it would be interesting to observe
its performance to detect subsets corresponding to single anomaly type when multiple
types of anomalies are present. Finally, we can also evaluate the efficacy of DeepFGSS
in a multiple model setting where M0 will learn the distribution of data under the null
hypothesis that no anomalies are present and multiple Mis each learning the distribu-
tion of ith anomaly type. The idea will be to detect anomalies which have not been
detected before by any of Mis.
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Appendix A
Precision-Recall Plots for KDD
Dataset: Apache2
Figure A.1: Precision-Recall curves for KDD dataset with N=100 and Apache2 anomaly
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Figure A.2: Precision-Recall curves for KDD dataset with N=250 and Apache2 anomaly
Figure A.3: Precision-Recall curves for KDD dataset with N=500 and Apache2 anomaly
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Figure A.4: Precision-Recall curves for KDD dataset with N=750 and Apache2 anomaly
Appendix B
Precision-Recall Plots for KDD
Dataset: Neptune
Figure B.1: Precision-Recall curves for KDD dataset with N=100 and Neptune anomaly
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Figure B.2: Precision-Recall curves for KDD dataset with N=250 and Neptune anomaly
Figure B.3: Precision-Recall curves for KDD dataset with N=500 and Neptune anomaly
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Figure B.4: Precision-Recall curves for KDD dataset with N=750 and Neptune anomaly
Appendix C
Precision-Recall Plots for MNIST
Dataset
Figure C.1: Precision-Recall curves for MNIST dataset for N=100
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Figure C.2: Precision-Recall curves for MNIST dataset for N=250
Figure C.3: Precision-Recall curves for MNIST dataset for N=500
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Figure C.4: Precision-Recall curves for MNIST dataset for N=750
